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Right of Enemy Aliens and
Enemy Allies to Sue
BY WM. HEDGES, ROBINSON, JR.*
Since the case of Ex parte Don Ascanio Colonna,1 decided by the
United States Supreme Court on January 5, 1942, confusion seems to
exist as to the rights of enemy aliens to prosecute actions in courts in
this country. Much newspaper comment on this and subsequent de-
cisions of inferior courts has created many misconceptions regarding the
effect of this decision.
In the Colonna case, the Italian Ambassador sought permission to
file writs of prohibition and mandamus directed to a federal district
court upon the allegation that a vessel and its oil cargo, which were
the subject of litigation in the district court, belonged to the Italian
Government and were therefore entitled to the benefit of Italy's sovereign
immunity from suit. After the petition was filed, war between the
United States and Italy was declared. Section 7 (b) of the "Trading
with the Enemy Act ' '2 contains among other things, the following
provision: "Nothing in this act shall be deemed to authorize the prose-
cution of any suit or action at law or in equity in any court within the
United States by an enemy or ally of enemy prior to the end of the
war except as provided in Section ten hereof: Provided, however, that
an enemy or ally of enemy licensed to do business under this act may
prosecute and maintain any such suit or action so far as the same arises
solely out of the business transacted within the United States under
such licenses and so long as such license remains in full force and effect,
and provided further: That an enemy or ally of enemy may defend by
counsel any suit in equity or action at law which may be brought
against him."
In its opinion the court points out that the word "enemy" is de-
fined by the act to include the government of any nation with which
the United States is at war. It, therefore, declined to the plaintiff
the right to file or entertain the application since "war suspends the
right of enemy plaintiffs to prosecute actions in our courts."
In order, therefore, to understand what the court meant by "enemy
plaintiffs" reference must again be made to Section 2 of the act 3 for a
definition of the word "enemy." The act provides as follows: "That
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the word enemy is deemed to mean (a) any individual or corporation
of any nationality resident within the territory or territory occupied
by any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident out-
side the United States and doing business in or being incorporated in
such territory; (b) the government of any nation with which the
United States is at war, or any political subdivision thereof, or any
officer, official agent or agency thereof and (c) such other individuals
as are natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which the United
States is at war wherever resident and wherever doing business (other
than citizens of this country) whom the President may by proclamation
designate as an enemy." The words "ally of enemy" are similarly
defined as they apply to allies of nations with which the United States
is at war. In other words, an enemy or ally of enemy to come within
the terms of the act, must be an enemy or enemy ally government or
its governmental agency, a non-resident alien enemy or ally, or a resi-
dent alien enemy or ally who is designated as such by the President.
Hence resident enemy aliens are not enemies within the meaning of the
act unless proclaimed as such by the President. To this date no such
proclamation has been issued. It should also be pointed out that no
restriction of any sort appears against enemy aliens to defend any suit
or action. If, however, their defense is in the nature of any affirmative
relief, then the provisions of the act may apply.
The confusion with which the Colonna case was first regarded is
illustrated by Kaufman u. Eisenberg,4 where the New York Court at
first ordered a tort action brought by a national of Germany stayed
until the end of the war. Thereafter on its own motion, the court
reversed itself stating that a different rule applies to cases dealing with
resident enemy aliens than to cases dealing with non-resident enemy
aliens. The court points out that a distinction was maintained at
common law between the rights of non-resident and resident enemy
aliens. The statute preserved this distinction and in addition gives to
licensed enemy aliens the status of an "alien friend."
The court draws two conclusions. First, since the act is not of
omnibus application and affects only the class or type of enemy alien
therein proscribed, the resident enemy alien has a right to sue or
prosecute in our courts until such right has been withdrawn by manifest
legislative intention or presidential pronouncement. Second, the act
is not intended to apply to non-commercial intercourse and since the
instant suit was in tort, the status of the plaintiff was immaterial.
Prior to the Kaufman case, the federal district court in Pennsyl-
vania on November 18, 1941, decided in the case of Verano v. De
Angelis Coal Company,5 that since no formal declaration of war ex-
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isted at that date between Italy and the United States, a motion to stay
a damage action on the ground that the plaintiff was a national of
Italy and an undeclared state of war then existed between the United
States and Italy, would be denied. It is not necessary that a formal
declaration of war exists, the court stated, referring to Hamilton v.
McClaughay,6 but a "condition of war" which is recognized by the
proper political department is sufficient. The court was careful to
state that if the plaintiff in that action should recover, and it "then
appears to the court that a condition of war does exist between the two
countries, appropriate action will be taken by the court on the basis of
the facts and circumstances then existing." However, it should be
pointed out that Section 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act ex-
pressly defines the beginning of the war as "midnight ending the day
on which Congress has declared or shall declare war or the existence of
a state of war." It would seem, therefore, that the limitations im-
posed by the act only apply when there has been an actual declaration
of war by Congress; but this does not mean that limitations imposed
on enemy aliens by common law may not be called into being in either
situation.
The final decision appearing under the present re-enactment of
the Trading with the Enemy Act is that of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts. In the case of Cappellote v. General Wool Com-
pany,' the defendant's motion for a stay on the grounds that the plain-
tiff was an enemy alien was denied since the action sounded in tort and
the plaintiff was a resident of the United States. Cases interpreting
the act during the last war are of the same general trend. There is no
doubt that the President may enlarge the definition of the term "enemy"
but until he does it would seem that resident enemy aliens have free
access to our courts.8
6136 Fed. 445 (1905).
'Case No. 42587, decided Feb. 18, 1942.
'See statement of Attorney General Biddle under date of Jan. 31, 1942.
As Soon Come My Chake
Ray Moses of Alamosa sends us the following letter which was
received in response to a request for payment of a delinquent account.
Antonito Colo Feb. 10 1942
Dear Friend I have a letter From you in what you say you Cant
go so Far in my Count. Dont get so toff. I Start in my Job the third
of this Month. As Soon Come my Chake I take Care in my Count.
I Expect they Come Before the TWenty of this mount. You Know
my Friend I was sow tight I cant send you all the amount But you wait
for your money as soon they Come I send Some Money.
Your Verry Truley JOE C
